The study reveals that top management of the companies decide to issue bonus shares when the investors undervalue the company while they go for stock split when the investors overvalue the company for a long time and promoters have to step in to correct these anomalies. This merely goes on to prove that capital markets are not inherently efficient even in the long run and promoters have to intervene to manage the prices of their stocks through corporate actions. This puts a question mark on the Market Efficiency Hypothesis and an effort has been made to test the ability of NSE to depict semi-strong and strong form of Market Efficiency Hypothesis.
As far as policy implications are concerned, the author suggests that:
• Companies may resort to bonus shares issue if the rate of growth of share price lag behind the market index and the rate of growth of sales and profit is higher than the companies included in the index.
• In contrast, they may resort to stock split if the rate of growth of share price is higher than that of the index while the growth in sales and profit is less than the companies included in the index. One should also be cautious while applying this rationale.
• There are significant number of companies (negative companies) which may resort to fictitious corporate actions even if their rate of growth of sales or profit or both are negative in order to mislead the investors by resorting to false signaling.
Executive Summary
I n the finance literature, the role of fictitious corporate action remains an enigma. Theoretically, fictitious corporate actions should be cosmetic corporate events as they merely involve the break-up of one share into a certain number of shares and a reduction of per share trading price without changing shareholders' wealth and relative shareholdings. The issue of bonus shares involves transfer of funds from general reserve account to share capital account on the liabilities side of the balance sheet. The face value of the shares remains the same while the market value tends to decrease in the proportion of increase in the number of shares issued. In the case of stock split, the face value of the share is reduced while there is no transfer of funds from capital reserve account to share capital account.
Fictitious corporate actions by the companies evoke many questions. One of the questions is why firms undergoing stock splits and bonus issue experience price increase over and above the increase in the index. The answer to this question needs analysis of the aftermath of the decision taken by the top management to undergo stock split and bonus issue. Another equally important question is to find the conditions under which the top management decides to undergo stock split or issue bonus shares. This question needs empirical analysis of the preconditions for undergoing stock split and bonus issues. Empirical evidence of this study will try to find the distinguishing factors which lead companies to go for bonus issue or stock split and how the top management takes these decisions.
Theoretically, fictitious corporate actions do not lead to any change in shareholders' value of stocks, capital structure, and financial position of the company (Modigliani and Miller, 1961) . Fictitious corporate actions can be used to test both strong-form and semi-strong form of Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) (Fama, 1973) . The semistrong form of EMH asserts that security prices adjust rapidly to the release of all public information. That is, current security prices fully reflect all public information. This hypothesis implies that investors who base their decisions on important new information after it is public should not derive above average profit from their transactions because the security price already reflects all such new public information (Brown and Warner, 1980) . The outcome of empirical researches shows that market reacts positively to the fictitious corporate actions. Hence, fictitious corporate actions can be applied to test the semi-strong form of EMH. Yosef and Brown (1977) studied the average behaviour of stock returns for 219 stock splits that occurred between 1945 and 1965 and found to have about 30 to 59 per cent abnormal returns prior to splitting. Since the splits are not announced until roughly two months before the effective date, this shows that stock splits after an unusual price increase. This means that the firms' decision to split their stocks after unexpected positive developments cause stock prices to increase. Another study by Grinblatt, Masulis and Titman (1984) examined the performance of stock splits around the ex-dates associated with their stock splits and uncovered apparent market inefficiency. If an investor bought shares of a firm the day before its ex-dates and sold them the day after the ex-dates, then on average, the investors would make abnormal returns of roughly one per cent for stock splits.
Such an observation appears to violate the notion of efficient markets because it suggests that an investor can make abnormal returns by trading stocks using a simple strategy based on publicly available information (Sharpe, Alexander and Bailey, 1996) .
Evidence from empirical research shows that market reacts positively to the announcement of a bonus issue. Woolridge's (1983) empirical study of the American capital market showed 0.986 per cent positive average abnormal ex-date return for a sample of 317 bonus issues. Grinblatt, Musulis, and Titman (1984) examined the results for the period 1967 to 1976 for the European capital markets and found an average abnormal return of 1.1 per cent.
The strong-form EMH contends that stock prices fully reflect all information from both public and private sources. This means that no group of investors has monopolistic access to information relevant to the formation of prices. Therefore, no group of investors should be able to consistently derive above average profit. Promoters with a higher than average stake in the companies going for stock splits raises doubt whether some agency effect may be involved with this decision. Hence effort should be made to relate strong-form EMH with agency effect at the time of fictitious corporate actions.
LITERATURE REVIEW
There are various theories explaining the rationale for fictitious corporate actions with its own unique tests to DILEMMA OF CORPORATE ACTION check the hypothesis. Since the publication of the classic paper of Fama, et. al. (1969) that investigated the share price performance of fictitious corporate actions, many hypotheses have emerged and empirical studies have been conducted to explain the puzzling market reaction to fictitious corporate actions.
Hypotheses relating to the Issue of Bonus Shares
There are various theories explaining the rationale for issuing bonus issues with its own unique tests to check the hypotheses. Each hypothesis will be discussed separately.
Signaling hypothesis -Several studies have shown abnormal returns around the announcement dates (e.g., Foster and Vickrey, 1978; Woolridge, 1983; Grinblatt, Musulis, and Titman, 1984) . This hypothesis suggests that the top management thinks that a company is undervalued by the investors if they do not take good performance of the company into account while valuing shares. In order to send a message to the investors, the top management decides to issue bonus shares.
Liquidity hypothesis -This hypothesis suggests that the top management issues bonus shares in order to increase trading volumes in the market so that shares are more widely held. This may be one of the tactics of the promoters to ward off the potential takeover of the company. Lakonishok and Lev (1987) investigated the liquidity hypothesis by examining trading volume changes after announcement of bonus issue and found that trading volume did not increase as a result of bonus issue. -Grinblatt, Masulis and Titman (1984) and Doran and Nachtmann (1988) were of the view that managers use bonus issue to attract attention from professional analysts so that valuation could be improved. -Ghosh and Woolridge (1988) and Banker, Das and Datar (1993) held that companies issue bonus shares to conserve cash. Hence they regard bonus issue as a substitute of cash dividend.
Attention-getting hypothesis

Cash substitution hypothesis
Semi-strong form EMH -The semi-strong form EMH tests the time taken for the security prices to adjust to the release of all public information, if at all it is able to adjust. This hypothesis holds that it may take time for the information to be disseminated to all the investors. Obaidullah (1992) found a positive stock market reaction to the announcement of bonus issue. Rao and Geetha (1996) estimated cumulative abnormal return of 6.31 per cent around the three days of the announcement of bonus issue.
Strong form EMH -Effort is made to test whether agency effect is involved at the time of issuing of bonus shares, i.e., whether there is any relation between issue of bonus shares and promoter stake which can be attributed to the role played by the insiders. In India, it is difficult to test strong form EMH because of lack of data. As per law, directors of a company are required to inform the trading in the shares of the company to the stock exchange which in turn is then posted at its website. Still, insider trading can take place without the knowledge of the stock exchange through benami account and India does not have any mechanism to track it. Hence this hypothesis has to be tested in India by indirect means. One method is to test the average promoter stake in the companies issuing bonus shares and see whether insiders could make abnormal profit out of it. In this way, it is possible to find whether some companies issue bonus shares to fool stockholders since many a times, a firm that is in trouble and unable to pay its regular cash dividend may announce that it is substituting an equivalent stock dividend (Damodaran, 2002) .
Hypotheses relating to Stock Splits
Signaling hypothesis -It argues that stock splits convey information about the current performance and future prospects of the splitting firms (Grinblatt, Masulis and Titman, 1984) . To be valid and credible, the signal has to be costly. Stock splits are costly signals because the fixed component of the brokerage commission increases the post-split per-share trading cost (such as odd-lot trading costs and administrative cost) of the lower priced shares (Brennan and Copeland, 1988; Brennan and Hughes, 1991) . The presence of positive abnormal returns around the stock split announcement that is found in many empirical studies ( Ikenberry, Rankine and Stice, 1996; Mukherji, Kim and Walker, 1997; Ikenberry and Ramnath, 2002) provides evidence for the signaling hypothesis.
Optimal trading range hypothesis -According to this hypothesis, stock splits are used as tools to realign the share price to a desired price range so that it is more affordable for small investors to buy round lots of shares. If the pre-split share price is at a high level, then a stock split is justified for improving the marketability of the shares (Baker and Gallagher, 1980; Lakonishok and Lev, 1987; McNichols and Dravid, 1990) . The reduction in trading price through stock splits enables the post-split shares to become more attractive to previously wealth constrained investors. In addition, Angel (1997) argues that stock splits can be used to move the share price into the price range where the institutionally mandated minimum absolute tick size is optimal relative to share price.
Liquidity hypothesis -Related to the optimal trading range hypothesis is the liquidity hypothesis. The liquidity hypothesis is based on the argument that corporate liquidity is affected by the per-share trading price (Maloney and Mulherin, 1992; Muscarella and Vetsuypens, 1996) . If the trading price is too high, then the liquidity may decline. A low per-share trading price attracts more individual investors and reduces trading costs. However, the evidence for the liquidity hypothesis is mixed. Conroy, Harris and Benet (1990) show an increase in bid-ask spreads after stock split announcements. Ferris, Hwang and Sarin (1995) present results of a reduction in depth. Ohlson and Penman (1985) and Koski (1998) report an increase in return volatility. These results indicate that corporate liquidity decreases rather than increases after the split. In contrast, Maloney and Mulherin (1992) and Desai, Nimalendran and Venkataraman (1998) observe an increase in trading volume during the post-split period, and hence provide support for the liquidity hypothesis of stock splits. Lamoureux and Poon (1987) , it suggests that stock splits increase the return volatility of the splitting firms and hence allow the investors to benefit from tax-timing options. Preferential treatment is given to long-term capital gains according to the US tax code. Short-term capital losses can be used to offset short-term gains. A security with a price that fluctuates wildly presents its holder with the opportunity to realize short-term losses or long-term gains to re-establish the short-term status. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) ; Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988); McConnell and Servaes (1990); and Kole (1995) , among others, it argues that high shareholdings "entrench" non-wealth maximizing behaviour in management. Lakonishok and Lev (1987) apply the managerial entrenchment hypothesis to explain stock splits. Managers make use of stock splits to enlarge the ownership base so that the percentage of shares held by large institutional investors is reduced. In this way, management makes it more difficult for any one group of shareholders to initiate action against them. Mukherji, Kim and Walker (1997) find that the number of shareholders increases after a stock split.
Tax-option hypothesis -Proposed by
Managerial entrenchment hypothesis -Put forward by
Target-price habit hypothesis:
This hypothesis proposed by Raymond and Yiuman (2000) considers the sociological aspects of maintaining a stable target-price habit. It argues that one of the principal reasons for stock splits is to conform to the market norm, which is established by mutual reinforcement among financial analysts, managers, and investors. This hypothesis holds that models based on economic reasons alone do not fully explain the rationality of stock splits.
Semi-strong form EMH -
The semi-strong form EMH tests the time taken for the security prices to adjust to the release of all public information, if at all it is able to adjust. This hypothesis holds that it may take time for the information to be disseminated to all the investors.
Strong form EMH -Effort is made to test whether agency effect is involved at the time of stock split, i.e., whether there is any relation between stock split and promoter stake which can be attributed to the role played by the insiders. The methodology will be the same as has been applied to the bonus shares.
HYPOTHESES
Hypothesis 1
H 0 -There is no difference between the rate of growth of sales of companies which had fictitious corporate actions and Nifty companies.
Hypothesis 2
H 0 -There is no difference between the rate of growth of operational profit that had fictitious corporate actions and Nifty companies.
Hypothesis 3 (a)
H 0 -There is no difference between the beta value of the companies which issued bonus shares and Nifty companies.
(b) H 0 -There is no difference between the rate of growth of share prices of the companies which undergo stock split and Nifty companies.
Hypothesis 4
H 0 -There is no difference between the promoters' stake of the companies which had fictitious corporate actions and Nifty companies.
Hypothesis 5
H 0 -There is no difference between the positive companies and total companies which had fictitious corporate actions.
Rationale of the Respective Hypotheses
Earlier studies have concentrated on the after-effects of fictitious corporate actions, and have not tried to find the reasons for companies resorting to such actions. The reasons for fictitious corporate action is based on internal management decisions which may not be studied empirically in a consistent manner to reach a concrete conclusion because of lack of authentic information.
In the current study, only four variables have been considered, viz., rate of growth of sales, profit, share price, and beta to analyse the reasons for promoters resorting to fictitious corporate actions. The objective is to develop a robust and parsimonious model to predict fictitious corporate action as the Altman Z-Score Distress Model. Hence the scope of this paper is limited and does not attempt to deal with various hypotheses stated in this paper.
The rate of growth of sales, profit, and share price has been compared with the Nifty average because promoters tend to judge whether their company is being properly valued by taking the Nifty companies as benchmark.
Hypothesis 1
To find out whether companies which had fictitious corporate actions have higher average rate of growth of net sales compared to the mean growth of net sales of the Nifty companies.
Hypothesis 2
To find out whether companies which had fictitious corporate actions have higher average rate of growth of operational profit compared to the mean growth of operational profit of the Nifty companies.
Hypothesis 3
(a) Bonus Shares -To find out whether companies which decide to issue bonus shares have lower average beta compared to the beta of the Nifty. (b) Stock Split -To find out whether companies which decide to undergo stock split have higher average rate of increase in the share prices compared to the increase in the Nifty Index.
Hypothesis 4
To find out whether companies which had fictitious corporate actions have higher promoters' stake compared to Nifty companies.
Hypothesis 5
To find out whether all the companies which had fictitious corporate actions are also positive companies. There are two main reasons for companies resorting to fictitious corporate action. One of the main reasons is that promoters think that their companies are doing very well but the capital market is not valuing it properly. Such companies which have positive rate of growth of profit and sales are called positive companies. In contrast, negative companies are those which are not performing well and have negative rate of growth of sales or profit but still promoters resort to fictitious corporate action in order to misguide the investors.
The fifth hypotheses tries to check whether such negative companies are significant in number or only few negative companies resort to such fictitious corporate actions. To the extent that negative companies are significant in number, this puts a question mark on the efficiency of capital market.
Technique Applied SPSS-13 was used and paired sample T-test was applied to test the significance of each pair. All the pairs were evaluated at the confidence level of 95 per cent. Discriminant analysis and Logit regression were applied with the idea that if the outcome was robust, then these techniques to develop a predictive model would be used to forecast as to when companies would resort to fictitious corporate actions and also tell the exact type of action. Also the model could determine whether a promoter is resorting to fictitious corporate action to value his com-panies properly (in case of positive companies) or to misguide the investors (in case of negative companies).
STUDY FINDINGS Bonus Shares
All the five factors which have been considered in the study show significant difference between companies issuing bonus shares and the Nifty companies.
The most significant factor that differentiates between the companies issuing bonus shares and the Nifty shares is the rate of growth of sales. Over these five years, the sales of the companies issuing bonus shares have been 34.5 per cent while the growth in the sales of the Nifty companies have been 21.8 per cent as per Table 2 . The value of 't' at 4.570 for degree of freedom of 5 (Table 3) means that the difference between the two mean is quite significant. This proves the fact that companies which issue bonus shares have significantly higher sales growth prior to the ex-date compared to the Nifty shares. Probably, this is the information which the company wants to pass on to the public which may have been ignoring its good performance.
The second significant factor is the rate of growth of operational profit. Over these five years, the operating profit of the companies issuing bonus shares have been 80.27 per cent while the growth in the operating profit of the Nifty companies has been 29.2 per cent ( Table 2 ). The value of 't' at 3.532 for degree of freedom of 5 (Table  3) means that the differences between the two mean is quite significant. This proves the fact that companies which issue bonus shares have a significantly higher operating profit growth prior to the ex-date compared to the Nifty shares. Probably, this is also the information which company wants to pass on to the public which may have been ignoring its good performance.
The third important factor has been the beta of the companies. Over these five years, the average beta of the companies issuing bonus shares have been 0.699 while the average beta of the Nifty companies has been 1 (Table 2). The value of 't' at -2.893 for degree of freedom of 5 (Table 3 ) means that the difference between the two mean is quite significant. This proves the fact that companies which issue bonus shares have a significantly lower beta prior to the ex-date compared to the Nifty shares.
In addition to these three factors, the study tried to analyse whether agency effect has any role to play in the issuance of bonus shares. The average promoter stake in companies which issued bonus shares is 49.1 (Table  2) while average promoter stake in the Nifty companies is only 39.33 (only 38 companies which are not public sector companies and have been in the Nifty for the major part of the year have been included to calculate the promoter stake for the Nifty companies). The value of 't' at 3.488 for degree of freedom of 5 (Table 3) means that the differences between the two mean is quite significant. This proves the fact that companies which issue bonus shares have a significantly higher promoter stake compared to the Nifty shares. The rationale behind this finding is that companies with a higher promoter stake is more likely to issue bonus shares because promoters have a vested interest to expand the business empire and would not like to part with cash by paying returns to shareholders in cash.
The last factor which has been taken into consideration in this study is the comparison between positive companies and total companies which have issued bonus shares. The rationale for taking this factor into consideration for this study is that there have been allegations of companies using bonus share issue to spread misinformation to the public. 37 out of the 165 companies which had issued bonus shares had either negative sales growth or profit growth or both. The value of 't' at 4.561 for degree of freedom of 5 (Table 3) means that the difference between the two mean is quite significant. Hence the number of negative companies may not depend on the random sample variations but on some inherent factors. In such a situation, the above-mentioned signaling hypotheses may not hold true for negative companies. Such companies have negative growth rate and may not be doing well. They issue bonus shares to mislead the investors and rig the price.
Stock Splits
Hypothesis 1
The study does not find evidence of a significantly higher rate of growth of sales of the companies going for stock split as compared to the mean growth of net sales of the Nifty companies. The annual average rate of growth of sales of companies going for stock split is 28.5 per cent while it is 21.8 per cent for the Nifty shares ( Table 2 ).
The value of 't' at 0.919 for degree of freedom of 5 (Table  3) does not significantly explain the difference in the rate of growth of sales.
Hypothesis 2
The study does not find evidence of a significantly higher rate of growth of profit of the companies going for stock splits as compared to the mean growth of profit of the Nifty companies. The annual average rate of growth of profit of companies going for stock splits is 69.2 per cent while it is 34 per cent for the Nifty shares ( Table 2 ). The value of 't' at 2.36 for degree of freedom of 5 as per Table 3 does not significantly explain the difference in the rate of growth of sales.
Hypothesis 3
The study finds evidence of a significantly higher rate of increase in the share price of companies going for stock split as compared to that of the Nifty companies. The annual average rate of increase of share price of the companies going for stock split is 93.95 per cent while it is 5.7 per cent for the Nifty shares ( Table 2 ). The value of 't' of 3.490 for degree of freedom of 5 as per Table 3 significantly explains the difference in the rate of increase in the share price.
Hypothesis 4
The study tried to analyse whether agency effect has any role to play at the time of taking decision of stock splits. The average promoter stake in companies going for stock split is 49.46 (Table 5) while the average promoter stake in the Nifty companies is only 39.33 (only 38 companies which are not public sector companies and have been in the Nifty for the major part of the year have been included to calculate the promoter stake for Nifty companies). The value of 't' of 5.394 for degree of freedom of 5 (Table 6 ) means that the differences between the two mean is quite significant. This proves the fact that companies which resort to stock split have a significantly higher promoter stake compared to the Nifty shares. The rationale behind this finding is that companies with a higher promoter stake is more likely to resort to stock split because they have a vested interest in maintaining the shares overvalued.
Hypothesis 5
The study does not find evidence of a significantly higher number of companies going for stock split as compared to the positive companies. On an annual average, 22 companies go for stock split out of which 20.33 are positive companies (Table 2 ). The value of 't' of 2.148 at degree of freedom of 5 as per Table 3 does not significantly explain the difference between companies going for stock split as compared to the positive companies.
DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS Bonus Shares
The first three factors analysed together shows that the obvious reason for the companies issuing bonus shares is that their rate of growth of profit and sales are growing at a rate above the rate of growth of the Nifty Index (assumed to be the benchmark for promoters), but their beta is less than the index. In a booming capital market, this means that investors are ignoring these companies. That is the reason why despite performing better than the market, their share prices lag behind the index and hence to signal their good results, they resort to issuing of bonus shares. Hence, this proves the signaling hypothesis.
The results of the above three factors can also be evaluated within the perspective of semi-strong form Efficient Market Hypothesis. Sometimes, the market may ignore good performance of a company. Especially, in a booming market, beta of less than one means that price of shares of the concerned companies is not increasing adequately to reflect their true value relative to other companies. In such a condition, there is a tendency for low beta stocks getting undervalued due to the impact of skewness on expected returns (Mcenally, 1974) . Even when the companies are performing consistently above average in terms of sales and profit growth, their top management has to send a signal to the capital market so that investors could take note of the good performance. When the undervalued companies issue bonus shares, increase in skewness is observed. This increase in the price of shares is because investors are willing to pay a premium for positively skewed shares which has an abnormally large number of positive price changes (Kraus and Litzenberger, 1976) . That is why when companies with good performance issue bonus shares, abnormal profit is observed. The reason is that potential investors try to collect more information about the company which issues bonus shares and value the shares appropriately. This shows that the market takes significant time to adjust to new information. Sometimes, sig-nal has to be sent to the potential investors by the top management to make the capital market semi-strong. Hence, capital market is not inherently semi-strong and has to be made so through positive action like issuing of bonus shares.
The last two factors create doubts on the ability of the capital market to automatically achieve strong form of EMH. Promoters always have a significant role to play in supplying information to the investors. This gives them leverage to manipulate the prices in the capital market. Empirical evidence shows that companies issuing bonus shares have significantly higher promoter stake than the average found in the capital market. This proves the fact that some kind of agency effect is involved in the issue of bonus shares. Since promoters have the knowledge about bonus issue even before its announcement, there is always a possibility of insider trading which cannot be completely mitigated by legal means. In addition, there is always a possibility of the company making a fool of the retail investors as well as potential investors. When a company is not performing up to the mark and does not have cash to pay dividend, it issues bonus shares. Therefore, as per the study, a significant number of negative companies issued bonus shares.
Stock Splits
Only two of the five factors which have been considered in the study show significant difference between companies going for stock split and Nifty. The difference between the companies undergoing stock split and the Nifty shares in terms of rate of growth of sales and profit is not statistically significant (Table 6 ). This means that the rate of growth of sales and profit cannot explain the decision of the top management to split the stock. The only reason which seems probable enough to explain the decision of the top management to split the shares is the abnormal increase in share prices as compared to the increase in the Nifty. Since neither there has been an abnormal increase in sales nor profit of the companies undergoing stock split, it could be concluded that the abnormal increase in stock price is due to the miscalculation on the part of the investors. The insignificance of factors like sales and profit difference between the companies resorting to stock split and Nifty shares means that a stock split does not have any signaling effect as hardly any significant new information is available with the company which could be delivered to the potential investors. Only when there is a significant increase in the companies' sales and profit undergoing stock split can it be concluded that there is need for signal from the top management to the investors so that the price of stocks could be revised accordingly .
The abnormal increase in the price of shares of companies undergoing stock split support the optimal trading range hypothesis and liquidity hypothesis. Since the stock price has increased abnormally without much fundamental changes in the top line or the bottom line of the company, the top management may fear that prices will come down as the investors realize their mistake. In order to deal with this problem and confuse the investors regarding the true valuation of the company, it may resort to stock split. The fact that the majority of empirical studies have shown abnormal returns after stock split goes on to prove that the top management in the majority of cases are successful in restraining the investors from distress selling after an overvaluation of the stock. Another reason is the decision of the top management to retain the price of the stock at a pre-planned range so that adequate liquidity is maintained.
The last factor which has been taken into consideration in this study is a comparison between the positive companies and all the companies which have gone for stock split. The rationale for taking this factor into consideration for this study is that there have been allegations of companies going for stock split to spread misinformation to the public. The value of 't' of 0.236 for degree of freedom of 5 as per Table 3 means that the differences between the two mean is not at all significant. Hence the number of negative companies may depend on the random sample variations.
Comparative Analysis of Bonus Shares vs Stock Splits
Companies decide to issue bonus shares when the shareholders undervalue the company while they go for stock split when the shareholders overvalue the company for a long time. That is why in case of companies issuing bonus shares, the average rate of growth of sales and profit is significantly higher compared to market proxy. Still, the average beta of the companies issuing bonus shares is less than one. Hence, in order to inform the investors about the good performance, companies issue bonus shares so that beta could be increased.
In the case of stock split, there is no significant difference between the rate of growth of sales and profit of the companies resorting to stock split and market proxy. Still, price of shares of these companies have increased at a much higher rate as compared to market proxy. This shows that investors have overvalued the shares.
This merely goes on to prove that capital markets are not inherently efficient even in the long run. Grossman (1976) and Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) argue that perfectly informationally efficient markets are an impossibility, for if markets are perfectly efficient, there would be no profit involved in gathering information, in which case there would be little reason to trade, and therefore markets would eventually collapse. Alternatively, the degree of market inefficiency determines the effort investors are willing to expend to gather and trade on information; hence a non-degenerate market equilibrium will arise only when there are sufficient profit opportunities, i.e., inefficiencies, to compensate investors for the costs of trading and information-gathering. The profits earned by these attentive investors may be viewed as economic rents that accrue to those willing to engage in such activities at the cost of noise traders who trade on what they consider to be information but which is, in fact, merely noise (Black,1986) . Fama (1998) considers that anomalies are chance events and are quite consistent with the market efficiency hypothesis. According to EMH, apparent overreaction of stock prices to information is about as common as under-reaction and post-event continuation of pre-event abnormal returns is about as frequent as post-event reversal. In contrast to the theoretical prediction of EMH, it can be seen that in a majority of the cases, fictitious corporate actions leads to abnormal returns. Hence the market is not inherently efficient and information asymmetry and gaps lead to inconsistency in matching of risk and return by the investors. In such situations, promoters have to step in and send the right signals to the investors so that their companies are valued properly by the market. There are also cases where promoters may issue bonus shares to mislead the investors. In order to deal with such situations, the law should be made stringent so that only positive companies could be allowed to issue bonus shares.
There have been cases where companies have issued bonus shares and resorted to stock split at the same time.
One of the recent cases is that of Unitech Limited. Although the present study does not deal with this situation, anecdotal evidence points out that when share prices have increased at a remarkable rate, say, more than ten times in a year and still the top management thinks that its share is undervalued, then in such a situation, it may resort to both stock split and bonus shares at that time.
Although researchers have tried to apply Discriminant Analysis and Logit Regression to segregate conditions when promoters resort to stock split and bonus shares, results were not satisfactory. Two methods to apply Discriminant Analysis and Logit Regression were tried:
• Segregating the companies resorting to bonus shares and stock split based on absolute rate of growth of sales, profit, share price, and beta for all the years considered for study.
• Segregating the companies resorting to bonus shares and stock split based on the rate of growth of sales, profit, share price, and beta for all the years have been considered for study after adjustment for these parameters of Nifty. In this method, the rate of growth of Nifty is deducted from the respective companies' rate of growth of sales, profit, and share price in order to convert them into relative rate of growth.
Although the latter method gave a better result than the former, still the results were not very encouraging. By the latter method, only 67 per cent of the original grouped cases were correctly classified with a low Eigen value of 0.121 and a high Wilk's Lambda of 0.89. This shows that it is not possible to turn the model containing rate of growth of profit, sales, and share price into a predictive model by using Multiple Discriminant Analysis as was the case with the Altman Z-Score Distress Model.
Hence as the last resort, the researcher tried to average out all the companies' rate of growth of sales, profit, and share price on an annual basis for five years. The results were very satisfactory. This shows that although at an aggregate level, there are clearly divergent reasons for issuing bonus shares and stock splits, at an individual company level, there are various other factors which influence the decision. One of the reasons for the success of the Altman Z-Score Distress Model in predicting distress was that distress is an involuntary act of top management. In contrast, the developing predictive model for corporate action is difficult because it is a voluntary act of management and diverse factors enter into consideration, which may not be known to the general public .
CONCLUSION
In the case of issue of bonus shares, the first three factors, viz., rate of growth of sales and profit as well as value of beta significantly explain the difference between the companies issuing bonus shares and the Nifty companies. This proves that the capital market is not inherently a semi-strong form of EMH and that the top management has to send signals to make the market efficient. Similarly, the last two factors, viz., stake of promoters and negative companies also significantly explain the difference between the companies issuing bonus shares and the Nifty companies. This shows that the market is not able to inherently depict strong form of EMH.
In the case of stock splits, only the rate of increase in share price explains the difference between the companies resorting to stock split and the Nifty companies. This proves that the capital market is not inherently a semi-strong form of EMH and there is a possibility of investors overvaluing the shares of certain companies for an unduly long time. Since the promoters' stake in companies resorting to stock split is higher than the Nifty promoters' stake, it could be concluded that the promoters' stake has a major role to play in the top management taking decisions regarding stock splits. As a defensive measure, promoters resort to stock split in order to restrain the price of stocks from falling.
Part A: Bonus Shares 
